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The Destruction of Cultural Heritage in Armed Conflict: 
The ‘Human Element’ and the Jurisprudence of the ICTY 
 
Janine Natalya Clark 
University of Birmingham, UK 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
During the wars in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, extensive attacks on cultural heritage 
took place. Established in 1993, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) has prosecuted some of these cultural heritage crimes, and it is the 
Tribunal’s work in this regard that constitutes the central focus of this article. Arguing that 
the ICTY’s jurisprudence has highlighted a crucial ‘human element’ of cultural heritage 
destruction, the article identifies two particular ‘human’ dimensions of cultural heritage 
crimes that can be extracted from the ICTY’s cases, namely an impact dimension and an 
intent dimension. If the Tribunal’s jurisprudence has thereby highlighted the powerful 
synergies between crimes against property and crimes against people, these synergies have 
wider practical implications. Adopting a functionalist view, this article ultimately seeks to 
show that cultural heritage has a potentially important and largely unexplored role to play in 
post-conflict reconciliation.  
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Introduction 
In July 2017, the United Nations (UN) Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO) proclaimed Valango Wharf in Brazil – which was the main arrival point for 
2 
 
African slaves during the nineteenth century – as a world heritage site.1 As Logan and Reeves 
underline, ‘There is a growing interest in the heritage associated with pain and shame at both 
international and national levels’.2 UNESCO has also long been concerned about Machu 
Picchu, the Inca Citadel in Peru, and recent changes introduced by the Peruvian tourism 
authorities aimed at controlling crowd numbers mean that from now on, visitors to Machu 
Picchu must purchase either a morning or an afternoon admission ticket.
3
 These two 
examples illustrate dimensions – or ‘layers’ – of cultural heritage.4 This article addresses a 
third layer. It is not about the creation or preservation of cultural heritage, but about the 
destruction of cultural heritage in armed conflict.
5
  
 
The European Council has vigorously condemned Islamic State’s ‘deliberate destruction of 
archaeological and cultural heritage in Syria and Iraq and the extremist ideology behind 
it…’.6 All of Syria’s six UNESCO world heritage sites have been destroyed or heavily 
                                                 
1
 Lucy Pasha-Robinson, ‘Valongo Wharf: Rio de Janeiro’s “Slave Harbour” becomes Unesco World Heritage 
Site’ (10 July 2017), <www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/valongo-wharf-rio-de-janeiro-slave-port-
unesco-world-heritage-site-brazil-a7833321.html>, accessed 12 Jul 2017. 
 
2
 William Logan and Keir Reeves, ‘Introduction: Remembering Places of Pain and Shame’, in William Logan 
and Keir Reeves (eds.), Places of Pain and Shame: Dealing with “Difficult Heritage” (Routledge, Abingdon, 
2009), pp.1-14, at 3. 
 
3
 Chris Leadbeater, ‘Will New Limits on Visiting Machu Picchu Save Peru’s Most Famous Inca Citadel?’ (21 
June 2017), <www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/destinations/south-america/peru/articles/machu-picchu-new-rules-for-
access/>, accessed 29 June 2017. 
 
4
 Michael Leach, ‘Difficult Memories: The Independence Struggle as Cultural Heritage in East Timor’, in 
William Logan and Keir Reeves (eds.), Places of Pain and Shame: Dealing with “Difficult Heritage” 
(Routledge, Abingdon, 2009), pp.144-161, at 159. 
 
5
 Destruction of cultural heritage, however, does not only occur in conflict situations. See, for example, Jeremy 
Keenan, ‘Looting the Sahara: The Material, Intellectual and Social Implications of the Destruction of Cultural 
Heritage (Briefing)’, 10(3-4) Journal of North African Studies (2005) 471-489, at 472. 
 
6
 European Council, ‘Council Conclusions on the EU Regional Strategy for Syria and Iraq as well as the 
ISIL/Da’esh Threat’ (16 March 2015), para. 8, <www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/03/16-
council-conclusions-eu-regional-strategy-for-syria-and-iraq-as-well-as-the-isil-daesh-threat/>, accessed 30 June 
2017. According to Vlasic and Turku, ‘the deliberate destruction, looting, and theft of cultural property by ISIS 
is perhaps one of the most brutal forms of cultural cleansing in recent history’. Mark V. Vlasic and Helga Turku, 
3 
 
damaged,
7
 including the Arch of Triumph in Palmyra.
8
 In 2001, the Taliban government in 
Afghanistan blew up the Buddhas at Bamiyan,
9
 a powerful illustration of the Taliban’s 
‘cultural terrorism’.10 Although the Buddhas ‘were not destroyed in the fighting’,11 a wider 
context of sporadic hostility and instability within Afghanistan surrounded the Bamiyan 
Valley. In northern Mali, the Morals Police Brigade – or Hesbah – destroyed ten cultural and 
religious monuments in Timbuktu in 2012, after Ansar Dine and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghreb took control of the area.
12
  The head of the Hesbah,
13
 Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, 
recently pleaded guilty to these crimes at the International Criminal Court (ICC). He was 
sentenced to nine years’ imprisonment.14   
 
                                                                                                                                                        
‘“Blood Antiquities”: Protecting Cultural Heritage beyond Criminalization’, 14(5) Journal of International 
Criminal Justice (2016) 1175-1197, at 1176. 
 
7
 Emma Henderson, ‘Syria’s Six Unesco World Heritage Sites All Damaged or Destroyed during Civil War’ (16 
March 2016), <www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/syrias-six-unesco-world-heritage-sites-all-
damaged-or-destroyed-during-civil-war-a6934026.html>, accessed 8 July 2017. 
 
8
 Russia Today, ‘6 Out of 6: All of Syria’s UNESCO Heritage Sites Damaged or Destroyed during Civil War’, 
(15 March 2016), <www.rt.com/news/335619-syria-unesco-heritage-damage/>, accessed 9 May 2017. The main 
arch ‘was originally built in the second century by the Roman emperor Septimius Severus to commemorate his 
victory against the Parthians’. Amr Al-Azm, ‘Why ISIS Wants to Destroy Syria’s Cultural Heritage’ (8 October 
2015), <http://time.com/4065290/syria-cultural-heritage/>, accessed 11 May 2017. 
 
9
 Barbara T. Hoffman, ‘Exploring and Establishing Links for a Balanced Art and Cultural Heritage Policy’, in 
Barbara T. Hoffman (ed.), Art and Cultural Heritage: Law, Policy and Practice (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2006), pp. 1-18, at 1. 
 
10
 Francesco Francioni and Federico Lenzerini, ‘The Destruction of the Buddhas of Bamiyan and International 
Law’, 14(4) European Journal of International Law (2003) 619-651, at 625. 
 
11
 Roger O’Keefe, ‘World Cultural Heritage: Obligations to the International Community as a Whole?’ 53(1) 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2004) 189-209, at 195. 
 
12
 See Sebastiaín A. Green-Martínez, ‘Destruction of Cultural Heritage in Northern Mali: A Crime against 
Humanity?’ 13(5) Journal of International Criminal Justice (2015) 1073-1097. 
 
13
 ‘The Hesbah was entrusted with regulating the morality of the people of Timbuktu, and of preventing, 
suppressing and repressing anything perceived by the occupiers to constitute a visible vice’. The Prosecutor v. 
Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, 27 September 2016, ICC, Trial Chamber, Judgment, ICC-01/12-01/15, 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2016_07244.PDF, accessed 9 November 2016, para. 33. 
 
14
 This case ‘marked the first time that attacks against cultural heritage constituted the principal charge in an 
international criminal case’. Paige Casaly, ‘Al Mahdi before the ICC: Cultural Property and World Heritage in 
International Criminal Law’, 14(5) Journal of International Criminal Justice (2016) 199-1220, at 1210. 
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If, as Vlasic and Turku underline, ‘International courts can and do play a role in 
stigmatization and bringing attention to these crimes’ of cultural heritage destruction,15 the 
work of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has been 
particularly important in this regard. Fundamentally, it was the ICTY that made the:  
…first concerted effort to establish that attacks against cultural property constituted crimes 
under customary international law and to hold those most responsible for these crimes, 
particularly senior political and military leaders, individually accountable’.16  
 
The Tribunal’s jurisprudence is therefore the main focus of this article. Underscoring that 
crimes against property and crimes against people are inherently inter-linked, the article 
centres on the crucial ‘human element’ of cultural heritage crimes.17 According to Loulanski, 
‘the conceptual focus of heritage has shifted’, inter alia, ‘from monuments to people’.18 
Exploring this shift within the framework of the ICTY’s jurisprudence, this article has two 
main goals. Firstly, it seeks to develop the conceptual linkages between property and people 
by examining how the ‘human element’ manifests itself within the Tribunal’s jurisprudence. 
Secondly, adopting a functionalist view of cultural heritage,
19
 it highlights new aspects of 
functionality by examining ways of practically operationalizing the human element. As a 
starting point, it draws on Lehrer’s work on ‘conciliatory heritage’.20 
 
                                                 
15
 Vlasic and Turku, supra note 6, at 1197. 
 
16
 Serge Brammertz, Kevin C. Hughes, Alison Kipp and William B. Tomljanovich, ‘Attacks against Cultural 
Heritage as a Weapon of War: Prosecutions at the ICTY’, 14(5) Journal of International Criminal Justice 
(2016) 1143-1174, at 1151.  
 
17
 Francesco Francioni, ‘Beyond State Sovereignty: The Protection of Cultural Heritage as a Shared Interest of 
Humanity’, 25(4) Michigan Journal of International Law (2004) 1209-1228, at 1220. 
 
18
 Tolina Loulanski, ‘Revising the Concept for Cultural Heritage: The Argument for a Functional Approach’, 
13(2) International Journal of Cultural Property (2006) 207-233, at 208. 
 
19
 M.M. Müller, ‘Cultural Heritage Protection: Legitimacy, Property and Functionalism’, 7(2) International 
Journal of Cultural Property (1998) 395-409, at 397. 
 
20
 Eric Lehrer, ‘Can there be Conciliatory Heritage?’ 16 (4-5) International Journal of Heritage Studies (2010) 
269-288. 
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1. Conceptualizing Cultural Heritage 
Wars and armed conflict leave deep imprints and scars not only on human lives, but also on 
landscapes. Falah, for example, argues that during the 1948 Israeli-Palestinian war, ‘Places 
that were the loci for Palestinian culture and national identity, the vessels of a collective 
memory of the region’s palimpsest-like cultural landscape, were obliterated in acts of de-
signification’.21 More recently, following the end of the 30-year ‘Troubles’ in Northern 
Ireland (1968-1998), ‘Littered across the rural and urban landscapes is the fabric of conflict, 
memorials, murals, defunct military installations and prisons emptied of the “political 
prisoners” they once housed’.22 The destruction of cultural heritage is a particularly 
prominent and visible aspect of altered landscapes in conflict-affected societies. It is also a 
dimension of conflict that powerfully highlights the intersections between property crimes 
and crimes against people. 
 
Two main conceptual approaches to cultural heritage can be identified. The first of these, 
object-centrism, focuses on the object itself and sees the object as having an intrinsic value in 
its own right. As Müller discusses, ‘Archaeology is a prime example of the philosophy of 
object-centrism. Archaeologists would prefer to leave an object untouched rather than risking 
its destruction through inadequate excavation techniques’.23 Attributing value to objects 
without any regard to their ‘users’, however, is a decontextualized approach that neglects the 
critical importance of human-object interactions. As Loulanski underlines, ‘…protection of 
                                                 
21
 Ghazi Falah, ‘The 1948 Israeli-Palestinian War and its Aftermath: The Transformation and De-Signification 
of Palestine’s Cultural Landscape’, 86(2) Annals of the American Association of American Geographers (1996) 
256-285, at 257. 
 
22
 Sara McDowell, ‘Negotiating Places of Pain in Post-Conflict Northern Ireland: Debating the Future of the 
Maze Prison/Long Kesh’, in W. Logan and K. Reeves (eds.), Places of Pain and Shame: Dealing with “Difficult 
Heritage” (Routledge, Abingdon, 2009), pp.215-230, at 216. 
 
23
 Müller, supra note 19, at 397. 
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cultural heritage becomes meaningless if it cares only for objects instead of human beings, 
because “preservation is sought, not for the sake of the objects, but for the sake of the people 
for whom they have a meaningful life”’.24 Object-centrism, moreover, cannot easily operate 
in the absence of clear criteria and guidelines, which are not always specified. Karl, for 
example, discusses the Austrian Denkmalschutzgesetz (DMSG), or heritage protection law, 
that was first adopted in 1923. He argues that ‘Since § 1 (1) DMSG determines that any man-
made object is a Denkmal (a “monument” or “cultural heritage”), and no criteria are 
introduced in the DMSG or have been published by the BDA [National Heritage Agency] as 
to what man-made objects cannot be a Denkmal’, it follows that ‘some additional criterion is 
needed to determine what man-made objects have to be protected by the law as cultural 
heritage and what not’.25 In other words, the realities of a purist approach to object-centrism 
can potentially affect how people live their lives. In the absence of criteria identifying which 
objects are to be protected, ‘one would not be allowed to damage, change or export any man-
made object without a permit by the BDA and since normal use damages and changes every 
object, modern life would grind to a complete halt’.26 
 
In contrast to object-centrism, a functionalist conceptualization of cultural heritage centres on 
people as the pivotal referent object. The significance of cultural heritage thus derives from 
how people use it and from the meanings that they assign to it. Highlighting the synergies 
between functionalism and social-constructivism, Müller notes that ‘For proponents of 
functionalism, cultural heritage is a purely human construction, not only because it is made 
                                                 
24
 T. Loulanski, supra note 18, at 216, citing Frank G. Fechner, ‘The Fundamental Aims of Cultural Property 
Law’, 7(2) International Journal of Cultural Property (1998) 376–394, at 378. 
 
25
 Raimund Karl, ‘More Tales from Heritage Hell: Law, Policy and Practice of Archaeological Heritage 
Protection in Austria’, 7(4) The Historic Environment: Policy and Practice (2016) 283-300, at 292. 
 
26
 Ibid., at 292-293. 
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by men and women but also because it is defined by them. Our world is socially constructed, 
and so are the meanings and functions that are assigned to objects’.27 If functionalist views of 
cultural heritage are widely held,
28
 they themselves can be further categorized into two types. 
D’Andrade distinguishes between, on one hand, ‘a high consensus code which everyone is 
expected to share’, and, on the other, ‘a proliferating number of distributed knowledge 
systems’.29 These distributed knowledge systems can refer to local cultures and the value that 
particular communities attach to them. Logan, for example, underlines that heritage is 
‘fundamental to cultural identity; it is those things that underpin our identity as communities 
– national, regional, local, even family’.30 Discussions of cultural heritage, however, 
frequently extend beyond the local and national, thereby focusing on a higher level of cultural 
heritage functionality. Returning to D’Andrade’s ‘high consensus code’, a critical factor in 
the maintenance of this code is the notion that cultural heritage is ‘part of the shared interest 
of humanity’.31 In other words, it belongs to all of us.  
 
Merryman refers to this shared ownership concept as ‘cultural property internationalism’.32 
This, he argues, ‘is shorthand for the proposition that everyone has an interest in the 
                                                 
27
 Müller, supra note 19, at 398. 
 
28
 See, for example, Müller, supra note 19, at 405; Brian Graham, ‘Heritage as Knowledge: Capital or Culture?’ 
39(5-6) Urban Studies (2002) 1003-1017, at 1004; Loulanski, supra note 18, at 216. 
 
29
 Roy G. D’Andrade, The Development of Cognitive Anthropology (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1995), p.216. 
 
30
 William S. Logan, ‘Closing Pandora’s Box: Human Rights Conundrums in Cultural Heritage Protection’, in 
Helaine Silverman and D. Fairchild Ruggles (eds.), Cultural Heritage and Human Rights (Springer, New York, 
2007), pp.33-52, at 35. 
 
31
 Francioni, supra note 17, at 1210. 
32
 John H. Merryman, ‘Cultural Property Internationalism’, 12(1) International Journal of Cultural Property 
(2005) 11-39. The term ‘cultural cosmopolitanism’ could also be used. According to Costa, ‘In general terms, 
cosmopolitanism can be described as a form of universalism that builds on the metaphor that all human beings 
are “citizens of the world”’. M. Victoria Costa, ‘Cultural Cosmopolitanism and Civic Education’, Philosophy of 
Education Archive (2005) 250-258, at 250. 
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preservation and enjoyment of cultural property, wherever it is situated, from whatever 
cultural or geographic source it derives’.33 This cultural property internationalism finds a 
strong expression in the key international conventions on cultural heritage, including the 
1954 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict. The 
first international treaty that deals entirely with the protection of cultural heritage in situations 
of armed conflict,
34
 the Convention’s cosmopolitan ethos is especially reflected in its 
Preamble. According to this, ‘…damage to cultural property belonging to any people 
whatsoever means damage to the cultural heritage of all mankind’, based on the fact that 
‘each people makes its contribution to the culture of the world’35. It further underlines ‘…that 
the preservation of the cultural heritage is of great importance for all peoples of the world and 
that it is important that this heritage should receive international protection’.36 The 
Convention’s broad definition of cultural property – contained in Article 1 – similarly 
conveys a distinctly internationalist logic. Cultural property is defined, inter alia, as ‘movable 
or immovable property of great importance to the cultural heritage of every people’, 
including works of art, archaeological sites, books and scientific collections.
37
  
                                                 
33
 Merryman, ibid., at 11. 
 
34
 Višnja Kisić, ‘From Targeted Destruction of Cultural Heritage during the Wars to Wars of Memory in Former 
Yugoslav Countries, or How to Understand Conflicting Potential of Cultural Heritage?’ in Branka Benčić, 
Eugen Jakovčić and Tihana Puc (eds.), Spomenici na nišanu: Zatiranje povjesti i sjećanja/Targeting 
Monuments: Targeting History and Memory (SENSE – Transitional Justice Centre Pula, Pula, 2017), pp. 13-18, 
at 15. Earlier conventions did, however, mention cultural property. The Hague Regulations, for example, state 
that ‘In sieges and bombardments all necessary steps must be taken to spare, as far as possible, buildings 
dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals, and places where the 
sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not being used at the time for military purposes’. Convention 
(IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of Law on Land and its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and 
Customs of Law on Land (18 October 1907), Art. 27, <http://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/195>, accessed 8 
May 2017. 
 
35
 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (14 May 1954), Preamble, 
<www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/themes/armed-conflict-and-heritage/convention-and-protocols/1954-hague-
convention/>, accessed 31 May 2017. 
 
36
 Ibid. 
37
 Ibid., at Art. 1(a). 
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That all of us have a stake in the preservation of cultural property means that States, in turn, 
have an obligation to ‘do no harm’. Article 4(1) of the Convention stipulates that:  
 
The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect cultural property situated within their own 
territory as well as within the territory of other High Contracting Parties by refraining from any 
use of the property and its immediate surroundings or of the appliances in use for its protection 
for purposes which are likely to expose it to destruction or damage in the event of armed 
conflict; and by refraining from any act of hostility, directed against such property.
38
  
 
 
Exploring the relationship between human rights and cultural heritage, Logan contends that 
there is a conceptual contradiction between the two. While the essence of human rights is 
universality – these rights should apply to everyone – ‘the concept of cultural heritage is 
culturally, temporally, and geographically specific’.39 The crucial point is that the 1954 
Convention does not conceptualize cultural heritage in these terms. Notwithstanding its 
cultural internationalism, however, it does contain a ‘significant concession to nationalism’.40 
Specifically, Article 4(2) provides that the obligations contained in the aforementioned 
Article 4(1) ‘may be waived only in cases where military necessity imperatively requires 
such a waiver’.41 ‘Military necessity’ is an intrinsically vague and opaque term that is open to 
multiple and competing interpretations,
42
 and its inclusion within the Convention illuminates 
an important distinction between ‘political realism and political idealism’.43 The Convention 
                                                 
38
 Ibid., at Art. 4(1). 
 
39
 Logan, supra note 30, at 44. 
 
40
 John H. Merryman, ‘Two Ways of Thinking about Cultural Property’, 80(4) American Journal of 
International Law (1986) 831-853, at 837. 
 
41
 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, supra note 35, at Art. 4(1). 
 
42
 Dill and Shue emphasize that ‘Historically, “military necessity” has been interpreted in profoundly pernicious 
ways’. Janina Dill and Henry Shue, ‘Limiting the Killing in War: Military Necessity and the St. Petersburg 
Assumption’, 26(3) Ethics and International Affairs (2012) 311-333, at 320. 
 
43
 Henry C. Emery, ‘What is Realpolitik?’ 25(4) International Journal of Ethics (1915) 448-468, at 451. 
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broadly embodies the latter; and compared to the earlier UNESCO draft,
44
 it makes fewer 
references to military necessity.
45
 However, the very fact that it recognizes a military 
necessity exception necessarily limits ‘the fundamental duty of respect for cultural property 
both under general and special protection as enshrined in Articles 4 and 11…’.46 
 
 
The 1954 Convention also has two Protocols. The second of these, which was adopted in 
1999, is noteworthy. Not only does it contain a ‘significantly narrowed down’ version of the 
military necessity exception,
47
 but it also creates a new category of enhanced protection for 
cultural heritage. Yet, once again, this concept of enhanced protection reflects a dialectic 
between internationalist ideals, on one hand, and political and military realities on the other. 
Illustrating this, Article 10 of Protocol II states that:  
 
Cultural property may be placed under enhanced protection provided that it meets the following 
three conditions:  
 
a. it is cultural heritage of the greatest importance for humanity;  
 
b. it is protected by adequate domestic legal and administrative measures recognising its 
exceptional cultural and historic value and ensuring the highest level of protection;  
 
c. it is not used for military purposes or to shield military sites and a declaration has been made 
by the Party which has control over the cultural property, confirming that it will not be so 
used.
48
 
 
 
                                                 
44
 Drazewska notes that the 1953 UNESCO draft ‘contained a reference to military necessity in the preamble, 
and made a number of obligations conditional upon it’, including ‘the obligation to prevent or put a stop to theft 
and any acts of damage not justified by military necessity’. Berenika Drazewska, ‘The Human Dimension of the 
Protection of the Cultural Heritage from Destruction during Armed Conflicts’, 22(2-3) International Journal of 
Cultural Property (2015) 205-228, at 209-210. 
 
45
 Ibid., at 210. 
 
46
 Ibid. 
 
47
 Ibid., at 211. See Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in 
the Event of Armed Conflict (26 March 1999), Art. 6(a) and (b), 
<http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0018/001875/187580e.pdf>, accessed 31 May 2017. 
 
48
 Second Protocol, ibid, at Art. 10. 
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Internationalism and cosmopolitanism are intrinsically connected with the global, and in 
particular with global risks. As Beck underscores, ‘Global risks tear down national 
boundaries and jumble together the native with the foreign. The distant other is becoming the 
inclusive other’.49 When the risks are closer to home, however, and when they primarily 
affect the national, the 1954 Convention and its Protocol II make clear that military 
considerations take priority. 
 
If there are necessarily practical limits – rooted in Realpolitik – to the idea that all of us have 
a vested interest in the preservation of cultural heritage, some scholars have criticized the 
internationalization of cultural heritage on more conceptual grounds. After the 1954 
Convention, the second major international document relating to cultural heritage is the 1972 
Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage. The 
Preamble of this states, inter alia, that ‘…deterioration or disappearance of any item of the 
cultural or natural heritage constitutes a harmful impoverishment of the heritage of all the 
nations of the world’.50 It further underlines ‘the importance, for all the peoples of the world, 
of safeguarding this unique and irreplaceable property, to whatever people it may belong’; 
and it states that ‘parts of the cultural or natural heritage are of outstanding interest and 
therefore need to be preserved as part of the world heritage of mankind as a whole’.51 For 
Müller, the language used in the Convention is overly broad. What does it mean, for example, 
to speak of the ‘interest of humankind?’52 Insisting that ‘“Humankind” is not a manageable 
                                                 
49
 Ulrich Beck, ‘The Cosmopolitan Condition: Why Methodological Nationalism Fails’, 24(7-8) Theory, Culture 
and Society (2007) 286-290, at 287. 
50
 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (16 November 1972), 
Preamble, <http://whc.unesco.org/archive/convention-en.pdf>, accessed at 1 June 2017. 
 
51
 Ibid. 
 
52
 Müller, supra note 19, at 403. 
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legal term’,53 he also raises important questions regarding representation. Fundamentally, 
who is entitled to speak on behalf of ‘humankind?’54  
 
The internationalist rhetoric which the 1972 Convention embraces potentially limits the scope 
for alternative voices and viewpoints to be expressed and heard. In 2001, for example, the 
then secretary of UNESCO, Koïchiro Matsuura, referred to the aforementioned destruction of 
the Bamiyan Buddhas in Afghanistan as a ‘crime against culture’.55 Yet, as Williams points 
out, this assumes that ‘“culture” has an intrinsic universal value…’.56 Not everyone attaches 
the same value, or the same meaning, to ‘culture’, and indeed ‘the very fact of the Buddha’s 
destruction speaks of a counter narrative to the UNESCO mantra of universal value’.57 Even 
when groups share a particular space, this does not necessarily mean that they will attach the 
same value to the cultural products within that space. As Weinert articulates, ‘Shared space 
does not of course imply uniformity in the ways spaces are experienced, understood, 
interpreted, developed, acted upon, and reimagined’.58 
 
If the emphasis on the universal and ‘humankind’ is excessively broad, cultural heritage 
clearly has a quintessential human dimension. The destruction of cultural heritage during 
armed conflict, in short, is not simply a property crime but a crime that illuminates critical 
                                                 
53
 Ibid. 
 
54
 Ibid. 
 
55
 Cited in Francesco Bandarin, ‘Editorial’, 30 World Heritage Newsletter (2001), 
<http://whc.unesco.org/en/documents/3063>, accessed 5 June 2017. 
 
56
 Thomas J.T. Williams, ‘A Blaze in the Northern Sky: Black Metal and Crimes against Culture’, 11(2) Public 
Archaeology (2012) 59-72, at 59. 
 
57
 Ibid. 
 
58
 Matthew S. Weinert, ‘Grounding World Society: Spatiality, Cultural Heritage and Our World as Shared 
Geographies’, 43(3) Review of International Studies (2017) 409-429, at 415. 
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intersections between property and people. Emphasizing this point, Francioni argues that 
‘…cultural heritage is linked to the human element. It represents the symbolic continuity of a 
society beyond its contingent biological existence’.59 The very term ‘symbolic continuity’, 
however, is necessarily abstract and difficult to pin down. This article is precisely about 
trying to concretize the ‘human element’ to which Francioni alludes within an international 
law framework. According to Francioni, cultural heritage is ‘part of the shared interest of 
humanity’, and hence there is a ‘consequent need for international law to safeguard it in its 
material and living manifestations, including the cultural communities that create, perform 
and maintain it’.60 The next section of the article focuses specifically on the jurisprudence of 
the ICTY, which has ‘broken new legal ground by prosecuting war crimes against cultural 
heritage…’.61 It demonstrates that the Tribunal’s judgments have helped to elucidate the 
critical ‘human element’ in cultural heritage which, in turn, enables deeper understanding of 
the practical significance of cultural heritage in post-conflict societies. 
 
2. The ICTY and the Destruction of Cultural Heritage in the Former Yugoslavia  
Every year, thousands of tourists flock to Dubrovnik in Croatia to explore the Old Town, to 
admire its eclectic mix of architectural styles and to walk along the medieval City Walls. 
Similarly, during the summer months, vast crowds descend annually on the Bosnian city of 
Mostar, a three hour drive from Dubrovnik. In the stifling Herzegovinian sunshine, they 
slowly make their way across the famous Ottoman bridge, Stari Most, frequently pausing to 
take photographs and to look at the swirling waters of the Neretva River below. During the 
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1990s, when ethnic and secessionist conflict engulfed the former Yugoslavia, both the Old 
Town of Dubrovnik and Mostar came under fire. According to the Commission of Experts, 
which was established by the UN Secretary-General at the request of the UN Security 
Council in 1992,
62
 ‘The shelling [of Dubrovnik] on 6 December 1991 was especially 
intensive. The shelling was selective and deliberately aimed at the buildings in the old town 
and there is no doubt that the destruction of cultural property was intentional’.63 On 9 
November 1993, a barrage of shells fired by Bosnian Croat forces tore apart Stari Most and 
thus destroyed a powerful symbol of inter-ethnic unity and connectedness.
64
  
 
Outside of Dubrovnik and Mostar, extensive destruction of cultural heritage accompanied the 
wars in the former Yugoslavia. According to Walasek, ‘… in the wider domain of heritage 
preservation, the impact of the devastation of the Wars of Yugoslav Succession was such that 
“Yugoslavia” was to become the paradigm of cultural property destruction during the so-
                                                 
62
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evidence of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law 
committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia’. UN Security Council Resolution 780 (6 October 1992), 
para. 2, <http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/780(1992)>, accessed 3 April 2017. 
 
63
 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Investigating War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia War 1992-1994: The United 
Nations Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992) (Intersentia 
Ltd., Cambridge, 2017), p.253. 
 
64
 The targeting of the bridge occurred alongside widespread attacks on cultural heritage in and around Mostar. 
According to the ICTY, ‘BH Muslim religious sites, like the mosques in the area, were systematically 
destroyed’. The Prosecutor v. Mladen Naletilić and Vinko Martinović, 31 March 2003, ICTY, Trial Chamber, 
Judgment, IT-98-34-T, http://www.icty.org/x/cases/naletilic_martinovic/tjug/en/nal-tj030331-e.pdf, accessed 7 
June 2017, para. 238. The Prlić et al. judgment comprehensively documents the destruction of cultural heritage 
in Herzegovina. In western Mostar, for example, the Baba Bešir mosque was ‘dynamited and completely 
destroyed around 10 May 1993’. The Prosecutor v. Jadranko Prlić, Bruno Stojić, Slobodan Praljak, Milivoj 
Petković and Valentin Ćorić, 29 May 2013, ICTY, Trial Chamber, Judgment, vol. II, IT-04-74-T, 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/prlic/tjug/en/130529-2.pdf, accessed 6 March 2017, para. 791. According to 
Drazewska, what is particularly noteworthy about the Prlić et al. judgment is that ‘…in spite of its qualification 
as a military objective, whose destruction would have allowed the HVO [Bosnian Croat army] to secure an 
important military advantage, the destruction of the Old Bridge was deemed disproportionate and hence, 
unlawful’. Drazewska, supra note 44, at 215. 
 
15 
 
called non-traditional conflicts that followed World War Two…’.65 Mosques, churches and 
places of learning were widely targeted, including the National Library (Vijećnica) in 
Sarajevo, which was attacked on 25 August 1992. During his testimony in the Slobodan 
Milošević trial at the ICTY, András Riedlmayer – an expert on Ottoman cultural heritage – 
described how the library burned for three days, resulting in the destruction of 1.5 million 
books.
66
  
 
The ICTY is not the first or only international court to deal with crimes against cultural 
heritage. At the post-World War Two Nuremberg Tribunal, for example, some defendants 
were prosecuted for crimes against cultural property. These included Alfred Rosenberg, the 
Nazi Party’s main ideologue. As the head of the Einsatzstab Reichsleiter Rosenberg or 
Special Staff, which was charged with looting cultural property in German-occupied areas, 
Rosenberg was ultimately found guilty of these and other crimes. He was sentenced to 
death.
67
 The fact that the destruction of cultural heritage was such an integral part of the wars 
in the former Yugoslavia, however, created an important opportunity for the ICTY to 
elucidate the human element of cultural heritage destruction – and to thereby demonstrate 
that the prosecution of these crimes is not about ‘privileging buildings over people’.68 While 
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some commentators insist that the Tribunal should have dealt with more cases involving the 
destruction of cultural heritage,
69
 this section is specifically about some of the cases that it 
has prosecuted – and about how this jurisprudence conveys the interconnections between 
people and property. Firstly, the Tribunal’s case law has emphasized the many ways in which 
people might be affected by attacks on cultural heritage (impact dimension). Secondly, it has 
powerfully highlighted that crimes against cultural heritage can reflect and embody malignant 
intentions towards certain groups of people (intent dimension). Both of these aspects will 
now be explored. 
 
 
2.1 The Impact of Cultural Heritage Destruction 
The ICTY’s two leading cases on the destruction of cultural heritage centre on the 
aforementioned shelling of Dubrovnik in 1991. Pavle Strugar was the commander of the 
Second Operational Group, which was part of the Yugoslav National Army (JNA).  The Old 
Town of Dubrovnik, which in 1979 was added to the World Heritage List,
70
 was shelled on 
several occasions in late 1991. Although  orders were issued – including by Strugar himself – 
which prohibited attacks on the Old Town, the Trial Chamber noted that ‘Despite these 
orders, on 9, 10, 11, and 12 November 1991, in the context of the JNA operations ordered on 
9 November, Dubrovnik, including the Old Town, was shelled’.71 During the attack on 6 
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December 1991, 52 building and structures in the Old Town were damaged or destroyed, 
including ‘monasteries, churches, a mosque, a synagogue and palaces’.72  
 
According to Article 3 of the ICTY’s Statute, violations of the laws or customs of war 
include ‘seizure of, destruction or wilful damage done to institutions dedicated to religion, 
charity and education, the arts and sciences, historic monuments and works of art and 
science’. The Trial Chamber in Strugar explained that: 
 
For the purposes of this case, an act will fulfil the elements of the crime of destruction or wilful 
damage of cultural property, within the meaning of Article 3(d) of the Statute and in so far as 
that provision relates to cultural property, if: (i) it has caused damage or destruction to property 
which constitutes the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples;
73
 (ii) the damaged or destroyed 
property was not used for military purposes at the time when the acts of hostility directed 
against these objects took place; and (iii) the act was carried out with the intent to damage or 
destroy the property in question.
74
 
 
Adjudging that all of these elements were satisfied in the Strugar case,
75
 the Trial Chamber 
moved on to address the defendant’s own responsibility for the shelling of the Old Town. It 
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found that Strugar did not order the JNA’s attack on the Old Town on 6 December 1991.76 He 
had only ordered an attack on a military objective,
77
 namely Mount Srđ. The judges also 
opined that Strugar was not responsible for aiding and abetting the attack.
78
 However, Strugar 
was found guilty on the basis of command responsibility.
79
 Article 7(3) of the Tribunal’s 
Statute states that: 
The fact that any of the acts referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute
80
 was committed 
by a subordinate does not relieve his superior of criminal responsibility if he knew or had 
reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the 
superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish 
the perpetrators thereof.
81
 
 
 
The Trial Chamber opined that Strugar was not aware prior to the start of the attack on Srđ 
that the forces under his command would shell the Old Town in a way that constituted an 
offence.
82
 However, information that became available to Strugar during the course of the 
attack triggered the operation of Article 7(3). According to the Trial Chamber, news of a 
protest by the European Commission Monitor Mission (ECMM) against the shelling of 
Dubrovnik would have put the Accused: ‘on notice of the clear and strong risk that already 
his artillery was repeating its previous conduct
83
 and committing offences such as those 
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charged’.84 Strugar was ultimately found guilty on two counts of violations of the laws or 
customs of war, namely attacks on civilians and destruction or wilful damage done to 
institutions dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences, historic 
monuments and works of art and science. His initial eight-year sentence was reduced on 
appeal to seven-and-a-half years, due to his deteriorating health.
85
 Strugar was granted early 
release in 2009. 
 
In its judgment, the Trial Chamber underlined that the destruction of cultural heritage 
constitutes a crime under customary international law. It pointed out, for example, that ‘In 
order to define the elements of the offence under article 3(d) [of the ICTY Statute] it may be 
useful to consider its sources in international customary and treaty law’, including the 
aforementioned 1954 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of 
Armed Conflict.
86
 Customary international law focuses heavily on States.
87
 The Strugar 
judgment, however, also implicitly addresses the human element of cultural heritage 
destruction, by referring to the human impact of cultural property crimes. It emphasizes, for 
example, that the Old Town of Dubrovnik ‘was, as it still is, a living town’.88 Prior to 1991, 
between 7,000 and 8,000 people resided in the Old Town and the medieval walls were an 
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integral part of their daily lives; ‘The Old Town was a centre of commercial and local 
government activity and religious communities lived within its walls’.89 Significantly, the 
walls also provided a sense of safety and security. The judgment notes that ‘…families and 
individuals displaced by the JNA advance on Dubrovnik had found shelter in the Old 
Town’;90 and ‘Some people from the wider Dubrovnik [area] had also been able to take up 
temporary residence in the Old Town during the blockade in the belief that its World 
Heritage listing would give them protection from military attack’. 91 In a recent documentary 
film produced by the ICTY’s Outreach Programme, Vedran Benić – a Dubrovnik-based 
journalist – reinforces the idea that the walls offered safety. He recalls that for a while, people 
even closed the city gates at night, as if to shut out the war and the shelling.
92
 
 
The ICTY’s other main case on the destruction of cultural heritage also centred on the 
shelling of Dubrovnik Old Town. Miodrag Jokić was the Commander of the 9th Military 
Naval Sector of the Yugoslav navy. After initially pleading not guilty, he subsequently 
pleaded guilty to six counts of violations of the laws or customs of war – including 
destruction or wilful damage done to institutions dedicated to religion, charity and education, 
the arts and sciences, historic monuments and works of art and science (count 6). According 
to the Trial Chamber judgment: 
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On 6 December 1991, JNA forces under the command of, among others, Miodrag Jokić, 
unlawfully shelled the Old Town… As a result of the shelling, two civilians were killed (Tonči 
Skočko, aged 18, and Pavo Urban, aged 23) and three civilians were wounded (Nikola Jović, 
Mato Valjalo, and Ivo Vlašica) within the Old Town. Six buildings in the Old Town were 
destroyed in their entirety and many more buildings suffered damage. Institutions dedicated to 
religion, charity, education, and the arts and sciences, and historic monuments and works of art 
and science were damaged or destroyed.
93
 
 
 
Jokić did not order the shelling of the Old Town.94 However, he had knowledge of the attack 
from the early hours of 6 December 1991;
95
 and despite his claims that he would conduct an 
investigation, ‘insufficient efforts’ were made in this regard and ‘no-one on the JNA side was 
punished or disciplined for the shelling’.96 Jokić, moreover, was aware that the Old Town of 
Dubrovnik, in its entirety, was a UNESCO World Heritage Site, and that ‘a substantial 
number of civilians’ were in the Old Town on 6 December 1991.97 He was ultimately 
sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment for violations of the laws or customs of war, on the 
basis of his individual responsibility (Article 7(1)) and superior responsibility (Article 7(3)). 
The sentence was upheld on appeal a year later. He was granted early release in 2008. 
 
As Jokić pleaded guilty, the judgment in this case – which is only a sentencing judgment – is 
short. However, while embracing the internationalist notion of cultural heritage destruction 
impacting all of mankind,
98
 it also strongly conveys the idea that crimes against cultural 
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property affect individual lives.
99
 Assessing the gravity of the crimes to which Jokić pleaded 
guilty, the Trial Chamber underlined that according to the Tribunal’s jurisprudence, ‘war 
crimes are not inherently less serious than crimes against humanity’.100 It further stressed that 
two of the crimes to which Jokić pleaded guilty – namely devastation not justified by military 
necessity and unlawful attack on civilian objects – ‘are, in the present case, very serious 
crimes in view of the destruction that one day of shelling ravaged upon the Old Town and its 
long-lasting consequences’.101 These passages of the sentencing judgment are noteworthy. 
Rather than make a distinction between crimes against people and crimes against property, 
the Trial Chamber recognized that the latter – like the former – leave deep long-term 
consequences. This, in turn, helps to reinforce the ‘human element’ of cultural heritage 
destruction. Like the Strugar judgment, for example, the Jokić judgment refers to the Old 
Town of Dubrovnik as a ‘“living city” (as submitted by the Prosecution)’ and notes that ‘the 
existence of its population was intimately intertwined with its ancient heritage’.102 As one 
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illustration, ‘Residential buildings within the city also formed part of the World Cultural 
Heritage site, and were thus protected’.103  
 
If the Strugar and Jokić judgments foreground an impact dimension of cultural heritage 
destruction, other judgments emphasize an intent dimension, wherein crimes against cultural 
heritage are interpreted as conveying harmful intentions towards groups. In this regard, the 
Tribunal has particularly underlined that attacks on cultural heritage can constitute 
persecution. 
 
2.2 Intention and Cultural Heritage Destruction 
The destruction of Stari Most in Mostar occurred during intense fighting between the Bosnian 
army (ABiH) and the Bosnian Croat army (HVO). As these former allies now turned on each 
other, this new phase of the Bosnian war particularly affected Central Bosnia. In the 
municipalities of Vitez, Kiseljak and Busovača, ‘…tensions increased between Muslim and 
Croatian populations’, and ‘The first acts of destruction of mosques and Muslim 
houses…occurred’.104 On 16 April 1993, the HVO carried out an organized attack on several 
Bosnian Muslim towns and villages in the Lašva Valley area. One of these villages was 
Ahmići, where over 100 people were killed. The ICTY has stated that ‘A clearer example of 
“ethnic cleansing” would be difficult to find’.105 
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In the trial of Tihomir Blaškić, who was the HVO commander in the Central Bosnian 
Operative Zone, the Trial Chamber commented on the symbolic importance of Ahmići for 
Bosnian Muslims in BiH; ‘Many imams and mullahs came from there. For that reason, 
Muslims in Bosnia considered Ahmići to be a holy place. In that way, the village of Ahmići 
symbolised Muslim culture in Bosnia’.106 The symbolic significance of Ahmići, in turn, 
meant that the destruction of the village’s mosques took on a wider meaning. Sprevak 
discusses the hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC), which ‘claims that important aspects 
of one’s mental life spill outside one’s head into objects in the environment’.107 
Quintessentially, HEC conveys the idea that external objects – such as laptops, phones and 
calendars – ‘can, just like one’s neural activity, constitute the realisation base of one’s 
cognitive processes’.108 Using this analogy, the destruction of cultural heritage can be viewed 
as an ‘environmental activity’109 that forms part of and reflects internal mental processes.  
 
In the Blaškić case, for example, the Trial Chamber stressed that the crime of persecution 
‘may take forms other than injury to the human person, in particular those acts rendered 
serious not by their apparent cruelty but by the discrimination they seek to instil within 
humankind’.110 A person’s discriminatory intent, in short, can spill over into the environment, 
and the destruction of cultural property is one example. The Trial Chamber noted that the 
Nuremberg Tribunal convicted Julius Streicher – the founder of the anti-semitic Der Stürmer 
– ‘of crimes against humanity inter alia for the boycott on Jewish businesses and the fire at 
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the Nuremberg synagogue’.111 The Jerusalem District Court, moreover, ‘stated in the [Adolf] 
Eichmann case
112
 that from the moment Hitler came to power the persecution of the Jews 
became manifest in the systematic destruction of the synagogues and the boycott of their 
businesses and shops’.113 The Trial Chamber thus concluded from its analysis that ‘the crime 
of “persecution” encompasses not only bodily and mental harm and infringements upon 
individual freedom’, but additionally ‘acts which appear less serious, such as those targeting 
property, so long as the victimised persons were specially selected on grounds linked to their 
belonging to a particular community’.114 This condition was satisfied in the Blaškić case.115 
 
Blaškić was found guilty of crimes against humanity, violations of the laws or customs of war 
and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. The ‘destruction and plunder of property and, 
in particular, of institutions dedicated to religion or education’ was successfully prosecuted 
under both Article 3 and Article 5 of the Tribunal’s Statute. He was sentenced to 45 years’ 
imprisonment. Although the Appeals Chamber subsequently overturned most of Blaškić’s 
convictions and reduced his sentence to nine years, it noted that ‘The destruction of property 
has been considered by various Trial Chambers of the International Tribunal to constitute 
persecutions as a crime against humanity’.116 Significantly, it also confirmed that ‘…the 
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destruction of property, depending on the nature and extent of the destruction, may constitute 
a crime of persecution of equal gravity to other crimes listed in Article 5 of the Statute’.117 
The fact that property crimes can amount to persecution, exteriorizing a discriminatory intent 
towards certain groups or communities, powerfully underlines the intersections between 
crimes against property and crimes against people. 
 
Of course, ‘property’ is a broad and diverse category. Indeed, Cribbet has stressed that ‘the 
meaning of the chameleon-like word property constantly changes in time and space’.118  It is 
noteworthy, therefore, that in the Kupreškić case, which also focused on the attack on Ahmići 
in April 1993, the Trial Chamber disaggregated the concept of property. Specifically, it 
argued that whether or not attacks on property constitute persecution depends upon the 
particular types of property in question. According to the judgment, ‘There may be certain 
types of property whose destruction may not have a severe enough impact on the victim as to 
constitute a crime against humanity, even if such a destruction is perpetrated on 
discriminatory grounds…’.119 It gave the example of burning someone’s car.120 In this case, 
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however, the Trial Chamber was dealing with the comprehensive destruction of Bosniak 
homes and property. It found that such attacks amount to destruction of livelihoods and can 
therefore have ‘the same inhumane consequences as a forced transfer or deportation’.121 
Focusing on the burning of residential property, as occurred in Ahmići, it further underscored 
that this ‘may constitute a gross or blatant denial of fundamental human rights, and, if 
committed on discriminatory grounds, it may constitute persecution’.122  
 
Attacks on cultural heritage are particularly significant in this regard. If, as the Blaškić Trial 
Chamber argued, attacks on property can amount to persecution ‘so long as the victimised 
persons were specially selected on grounds linked to their belonging to a particular 
community’,123 the deliberate targeting of religious objects such as churches and mosques – 
which are part of the fabric of community life – can potentially provide strong evidence of 
this discriminatory selection. The particular ways in which cultural heritage is attacked, 
moreover, can further afford evidence of an intention to discriminate. In the Brđanin case, for 
example, which focused on north-west BiH, the Trial Chamber remarked that ‘Unlike non-
Serb property, Bosnian Serb property was systematically left intact and only sporadically 
damaged’. It therefore found that ‘the destruction and appropriation of non-Serb property and 
religious buildings was discriminatory in fact’.124  
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What the ICTY’s jurisprudence has thus made clear is that the destruction of cultural heritage 
is not only a crime under international customary law
125
 and a violation of the laws or 
customs of war under Article 3(d) of the Tribunal’s Statute. It may also, even if it is not 
actually listed in Article 5, amount to persecutions – and hence a crime against humanity.126 
Indeed, according to the Kordić and Čerkez judgment – another case focused on Ahmići and 
the Lašva Valley – the destruction of religious buildings ‘manifests a nearly pure expression 
of the notion of “crimes against humanity”’.127 This is because such destruction, when 
committed with discriminatory intent, ‘amounts to an attack on the very religious identity of a 
people’ – and furthermore ‘all of humanity is…injured by the destruction of a unique 
religious culture and its concomitant cultural objects’.128 Alongside this broad reference to 
‘all of humanity’, the Trial Chamber also made it clear that persecution is a specific category 
of crimes against humanity because it requires a particular intent. In short, ‘This intent – the 
discriminatory intent – is what sets the crime of persecution apart from other Article 5 crimes 
against humanity’.129 If, therefore, attacks against religious buildings can constitute 
persecution, and if the crime of persecution requires an ‘elevated’ mens rea,130 this further 
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underscores the seriousness of cultural heritage crimes. Reinforcing this, the Brđanin Trial 
Chamber underlined that ‘…destruction of, or wilful damage to, Bosnian Muslim and 
Bosnian Croat religious and cultural buildings in the instant case occupy the same level of 
gravity as the other crimes enumerated in Article 5 of the Statute’.131  
 
Expounding on the specificities of discriminatory intent, the Trial Chamber in Blaškić 
accentuated that the crime of persecution ‘must be committed for specific reasons whether 
these be linked to political views, racial background or religious convictions’.132 In other 
words, ‘the perpetrator of the acts of persecution does not initially target the individual but 
rather membership in a specific racial, religious or political group’.133 This, in turn, makes 
clear that there are strong overlaps between the crime of persecution and the crime of 
genocide, the latter requiring a specific genocidal intent aimed at destroying, ‘in whole or in 
part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such’.134 The 2016 judgment against the 
former Bosnian Serb leader, Radovan Karadžić, confirms these overlaps and discusses the 
relationship between the two sets of crimes. Pointing out that the legal definition of genocide, 
as contained in the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, excludes attacks on cultural or religious property or symbols of the group, the 
                                                                                                                                                        
humanity under Article 5, when mere “knowledge of the context” of a widespread or systematic attack against a 
civilian population is sufficient’. Ibid., at para. 212, citing Judgment, Blaškic, supra note 104, at para. 244. 
 
131
 Judgment, Brđanin, supra note 124, at para. 1023. 
 
132
 Judgment, Blaškic, supra note 104, at para. 235. 
 
133
 Ibid. 
 
134
 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (9 December 1948), Art. II, 
<https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%2078/volume-78-i-1021-english.pdf>, accessed 6 March 
2017. 
 
30 
 
Karadžić judgment recognizes that ‘such attacks may nevertheless be considered evidence of 
intent to physically destroy the group’.135 
 
In the earlier trial of Radislav Krstić, the Chief of Staff and, subsequently, the Commander of 
the Drina Corps of the Bosnian Serb army (VRS), the Trial Chamber similarly noted that the 
legal definition of genocide is confined to acts aimed at the physical or biological destruction 
of a group, in whole or in part.
136
 It also acknowledged, however, that ‘…where there is 
physical or biological destruction there are often simultaneous attacks on the cultural and 
religious property and symbols of the targeted group as well, attacks which may legitimately 
be considered as evidence of an intent to physically destroy the group’.137 In this case, 
therefore, the Trial Chamber considered the deliberate destruction of mosques and Bosnian 
Muslim homes as evidence of an intention to destroy the group.
138
 According to Francioni, 
this is an important judgment because it ‘places new emphasis on the social existence of a 
group, as opposed to its purely biological existence…’.139 
 
Both the Krstić and Karadžić judgments are also significant from a genocide prevention 
perspective. A critical part of genocide prevention is the detection of early warning signs. In 
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2014, the UN Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect developed a 
‘tool for prevention’ in the form of its Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes (namely 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes).
140
 The Framework identifies eight 
common risk factors, including situations of armed conflict or other forms of stability (risk 
factor 1) and weakness of state structures (risk factor 3). Risk factor 7 consists of enabling 
circumstances or preparatory action, and the indicators of this include, inter alia, ‘Destruction 
or plundering of essential goods or installations for protected groups, populations or 
individuals, or of property related to cultural and religious identity’.141 The Framework also 
identifies two specific risk factors for genocide. The first of these is inter-group tensions or 
patterns of discrimination against protected groups, indicators of which can include ‘Denial 
of the existence of protected groups or of recognition of elements of their identity’.142 The 
second specific risk factor for genocide is signs of an intent to destroy in whole or in part a 
protected group. One such sign might be ‘Attacks against or destruction of homes, farms, 
businesses or other livelihoods of a protected group and/or of their cultural or religious 
symbols and property’.143 In other words, crimes against cultural heritage should not be 
viewed as isolated acts. As the ICTY’s Deputy Prosecutor, Michelle Jarvis, has pointed out, 
they can be a harbinger of more serious crimes to come.
144
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Taken as a whole, the ICTY’s jurisprudence elucidates the crucial ‘human element’ of 
cultural heritage crimes.  It has shown that crimes against property and crimes against people 
are closely inter-connected in two key ways, namely through the impact that cultural heritage 
destruction has on human lives
145
 and through the intentions toward human lives that cultural 
property crimes can manifest. Conversely, these property-people linkages can be viewed 
more positively. Adopting a functional approach, the final section explores the potential uses 
of cultural heritage in post-conflict societies, specifically in relation to reconciliation.  
 
3. Utilizing the ‘Human Dimension’ of Cultural Heritage in Post-Conflict Societies 
The Rakuchu Rakugai Zu are part of Japan’s cultural heritage. Meaning ‘scenes inside and 
outside the capital’, the Rakuchu Rakugai Zu depict detailed images – painted onto folding 
screens – of medieval Kyoto and its surroundings.146 While the paintings represent a bygone 
era, a part of history, they are also part of the present. They convey ‘multiple meanings and 
messages to people, with a variety of modern social and economic roles, purposes, and 
functions…’;147 and they have been utilized in a range of contemporary contexts. As one 
illustration, ‘the Rakuchu Rakugai theme was used in the marketing strategy of a major 
Japanese electronics company on its newest digital plasma television sets, launched just 
before the start of 2006 Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) World Cup 
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in Germany’.148 For Loulanski, therefore, the crucial point about cultural heritage is that it is 
a living entity that constantly evolves and develops. The past that it represents ‘lives within 
the present and projects itself onto the future’;149 and this, in turn, means that ‘heritage ‘must 
be alive and functional to retain its worth and integrity’.150 Quintessentially, heritage is about 
people, and it acquires meaning in this human-centred framework. Reinforcing this, Graham 
maintains that ‘if heritage is the contemporary use of the past, and if its meanings are defined 
in the present, then we create the heritage that we require and manage it for a range of 
purposes defined by the needs and demands of our present societies’.151  
 
In societies that have been torn apart by war and armed conflict, many of the common 
everyday needs that people have – for economic security, ‘normality’, stability – cannot be 
easily fulfilled in the absence of peace and some level of reconciliation, defined as the repair 
and restoration of relationships and the re-building of trust.
152
 Transitional justice, the process 
of dealing with the past, is partly about facilitating and fostering peace and reconciliation. As 
defined by the UN, for example, transitional justice encompasses: 
the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempt to come to 
terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice 
and achieve reconciliation’.153  
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Within transitional justice practice, however, little attention has been given to cultural 
heritage  –  or to the possible connections between cultural heritage and reconciliation. This 
article maintains that these connections represent the ultimate expression of the ‘human 
element’ of cultural heritage. 
 
A crucial starting point in this regard is Lehrer’s concept of ‘conciliatory heritage’. Defining 
reconciliation as ‘an organic process that unfolds in daily life, within and between aggrieved 
communities’,154 Lehrer argues that heritage sites can offer invaluable opportunities for story-
telling and spontaneous forms of ‘testimony’ – which, in turn, create ‘the conditions for new 
communities of listeners’.155 She uses the example of ‘Jewish’ venues in Kazimierz, the 
historical Jewish quarter of Cracow in Poland. Although Kazimierz is no longer a Jewish 
neighbourhood, ‘Since the early 1990s in post-communist Poland, non-Jewish “heritage 
brokers” in Kazimierz have played key roles in cultivating conditions for the flowering and 
ferment of Polish-Jewish culture’.156 When Jews visit Kazimierz, they often tell their stories – 
‘particularly stories of pain caused by Poles’.157 This enables the development of new 
understanding and empathy between Jews and Poles as they listen to each other’s stories and 
truths.
158
 In this way, Kazimerz functions as a ‘nurturing’ public space, drawing ‘estranged 
groups together to do the hard work of practising conciliatory heritage’.159 
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Basu, similarly, has highlighted the potential relationship between cultural heritage and 
reconciliation. His specific focus is on Sierra Leone, which experienced a bloody civil war 
between 1991 and 2002. According to Pinker, culture is intrinsically a process of learning. In 
his words, ‘A mind unequipped to discern other people’s beliefs and intentions, even if it can 
learn in other ways, is incapable of the kind of learning that perpetuates culture’.160 Basu’s 
argument is that cultural heritage can facilitate this learning process; and if people understand 
each other’s cultures, this provides an important basis for building inter-group understanding 
and respect. For him, therefore, cultural heritage is a valuable resource ‘through which to 
incorporate – and, indeed, confront – the conflictual past in the present as the nation 
endeavours to build a sustaining peace for the future’.161 
 
If cultural heritage is quintessentially about people, it should be used in the complex process 
of restoring and re-building human relationships fractured by violence and armed conflict. To 
return to the example of Stari Most in Mostar, the bridge was officially re-opened in July 
2004 after extensive reconstruction work. However, this should not be the end of the story, 
and the bridge could have a role to play in helping to narrow the continuing divides between 
Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats who reside in the city. Creating opportunities for Bosniaks to 
tell Bosnian Croats how they felt when the bridge was destroyed, what the bridge meant to 
them – and conversely, for Bosnian Croats in Mostar to share their own memories and 
feelings – could be important steps forward. In Dubrovnik, similarly, individuals and families 
who directly experienced the shelling on 6 December 1991 should have an opportunity to 
speak to Serbs about the Old Town, what it meant to them and their sense of safety and 
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security – which JNA shells destroyed – inside the City Walls. Creating the conditions for 
mutual understanding and empathy is a critical part of any reconciliation process. 
 
On 10 June 1838, 28 Aboriginal men and women from the Wirrayaraay tribe were massacred 
at Myall Creek Station in Australia. More than a century and a half later, on 10 June 2000, a 
ceremony was held to inaugurate a memorial to the dead. The fact that descendants from both 
sides – victims and perpetrators – participated in the ceremony was important, but so too was 
the location.  According to Batten, ‘A major factor in the significance and power of the place 
is its landscape: gum trees and golden grasslands. These things are a catalyst for reflection, 
and as such, can be a catalyst for reconciliation’.162 Likewise, cultural heritage sites can be 
catalysts for reflection. In post-conflict societies, therefore, the emphasis should not only be 
on restoring damaged and destroyed heritage sites, but also on exploring and utilizing their 
potential to foster such reflection – and ultimately inter-human understanding. 
 
Conclusion 
In June 2017, the author travelled to Sarajevo to take part in the ICTY’s final Legacy 
Conference.
163
 Various materials produced by the Tribunal’s Outreach Programme were on 
display in front of the main conference room, for participants to take home with them. These 
materials included two documentaries. One of these focused on the atrocities (killings, 
tortures, rapes) committed in the eastern Bosnian town of Višegrad.164 The other was about 
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Dubrovnik and crimes against cultural heritage.
165
 On the final morning of the conference, it 
was striking that while all of the Višegrad DVDs had been taken, many of the Dubrovnik 
DVDs remained on the tables. Was this because the conference participants, many of whom 
were from BiH, were less interested the crimes that took place in Croatia? Was it because 
they attached less importance to crimes against cultural heritage than they did to crimes 
against people? 
 
Stressing the inter-linkages between both sets of crimes, and embracing a functionalist view 
of cultural heritage, this article has sought to foreground what Francioni has termed the 
‘human element’ of cultural heritage. More particularly, it has argued that the jurisprudence 
of the ICTY has critically helped to elucidate this human element. Through an analysis of the 
Tribunal’s key cases, it has shown that this human element can be conceptualized in two 
main ways, namely through an emphasis on impact (impact dimension) and on intention 
(intent dimension).  
 
The final part of the article sought to operationalize the human element of cultural heritage, 
by arguing that there is an important – and unexplored – place for cultural heritage in post-
conflict reconciliation processes. Creating opportunities for people to understand each other’s 
culture provides a strong foundation for the development of deeper forms of human 
understanding. According to Logan, heritage consists of:  
…things about which we are usually proud; but sometimes they may be important and worthy 
of conservation because they are reminders of how societies can go wrong; they provide 
salutary lessons for present and future generations’.166  
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The challenge, thus, is to functionally utilize cultural heritage to draw out and learn these 
important lessons. 
